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WATCH YOUR STEP: RECOVERY FOR INMATE SLIP  
AND FALL 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
 
Rodriguez v. City of New York1 
(decided Sept. 1, 2011) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within our jurisprudence is an underlying philosophy that all 
citizens, even those who are imprisoned, are entitled to certain indi-
vidual rights provided by the United States Constitution.  The Bill of 
Rights, particularly the first eight amendments, provides individual 
rights applicable to the federal government.  The Eighth Amendment 
protects those imprisoned from suffering “cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”2  In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
depriving citizens of due process in a court of law.
 3  The language of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is crucial because “due process” serves to 
incorporate selective rights, such as those found in the Eighth 
Amendment, and make them applicable to the states.4  Furthermore, 
several remedial measures exist which may be utilized when one‟s 
constitutional rights have been violated.  For instance, one may file a 
claim under Section 19835 which “provides a civil claim for damages 
 
1 929 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). 
4 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of . . . any State . . . subjects, 
1
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against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives anoth-
er of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution.”6  
Therefore, it is possible that an inmate may successfully recover from 
a prison official for a deprivation of his constitutional rights. 
It is necessary to determine which acts of a prison official 
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  In Rodriguez v. City 
of New York,7 the Appellate Division, First Department addressed 
whether an inmate could recover damages after a slip and fall on 
flooded hallways in his facility.8  In the past, courts have found that 
slip and fall cases constitute negligence but do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.9  This seems fair, because any citizen may recover 
damages under the tort of negligence for a slip and fall; however, an 
inmate is not just any citizen.  Average citizens remain in control of 
their daily choices, but inmates are subjected to the care and control 
of prison officials.10  Undoubtedly, this is a result of the inmates‟ own 
criminal propensities.  However, it is the absence of self autonomy 
that contorts what is traditionally an issue of negligence into an issue 
of a potential deprivation of constitutional rights. 
This case note seeks to determine whether inmate slip and fall 
cases warrant recovery for a violation of the Eighth Amendment and 
concludes that they do not.  In coming to that conclusion the impor-
tance of providing remedies for inmates who have suffered a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights is not to be undermined.  Instead, this 
case note takes the position that inmates should enjoy the right to re-
cover for injuries sustained by slip and fall cases, but under a theory 
of tort law, not constitutional law. 
II. CASE AT ISSUE 
In Rodriguez, the plaintiff, an inmate at Anna M. Kross Cen-
 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any rights,    
. . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”). 
6 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
7 929 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011). 
8 Id. at 214. 
9 See Heredia v. Doe, 473 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that slip and fall 
cases satisfy claims of negligence, not violations of Eighth Amendment rights). 
10 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (re-
ferring to prisoners‟ lack of autonomy). 
2
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ter correctional facility (hereinafter “the Center”), alleged a violation 
of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments after he “slipped and fell on a wet floor” at the Center.11  The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant, a Warden at the Center, had 
knowledge of the leaks but failed to repair them, which amounted to 
a dangerous condition.12  The plaintiff also alleged that the defen-
dant‟s “deliberate[] indifferen[ce] to these „conditions of confinement  
. . . imposed a substantial risk of serious injury . . . .‟ ”13  Additional-
ly, the plaintiff alleged that a failure to provide him “with immediate 
medical attention” caused him “additional pain and suffering.”14  The 
Appellate Division, First Department found that the plaintiff failed to 
satisfy the requirements of a Section 1983 action for violation of con-
stitutional rights.15 
III. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS: 
a. Eighth Amendment 
Through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, states are bound by the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners 
held in their jurisdiction from cruel and unusual punishment.16  Since 
its inception, the Eighth Amendment has evolved to comport with the 
progression of society.17  For instance, in 1878, the Supreme Court in 
 





16 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214 (“The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohi-
bits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees prisoners humane condi-
tions of confinement.”). 
17 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (“[The Eighth Amendment] may 
be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as 
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”); Shannon D. Gilreath, Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment as a Mandate for Human Dignity: Another 
Look at Original Intent, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 559, 563 (2003) (“[T]he true genius of the 
Eighth Amendment, . . . is that its very construction invites successive generations of Ameri-
cans . . . to pose the inquiry of what constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment against a pa-
radigm of modernity, not bound by reference to a fixed historical point.”). 
3
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Wilkerson v. Utah,18 found that varying modes of capital punishment 
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.19  Logically, as the law evolves, so does the application 
of the Eighth Amendment.20  Although the expansion of Eighth 
Amendment rights speaks to a moral evolution, the full extent to 
which courts are willing to apply the Eighth Amendment remains un-
determined.  Therefore, the determination of whether punishment is 
“cruel and unusual,” such that it violates the Eighth Amendment, 
must be viewed in light of “contemporary standards.”21 
b. Section 1983 
Anyone who is deprived of a constitutional right at the hands 
of someone acting “under the color of . . . any state,”
 22 may file a 
claim under Section 1983 “which provides a civil claim for damag-
es.”23  Section 1983 was drafted to further “the preservation of human 
liberty and human rights” by allowing someone deprived of a consti-
tutional right to seek damages.24  Comparable to the application of 
the Eighth Amendment, courts have been liberal with the application 
of Section 1983.25  Courts have interpreted the language of Section 
1983 to provide two threshold elements necessary to stating a cause 
of action.  The first element requires an adequate claim of a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right, and the second element requires a show-
ing that such deprivation was caused by someone acting for the 
 
18 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
19 Id. at 134-35 (“Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but     
. . . the punishment of shooting . . . is not included in that category, within the meaning of the 
eighth amendment.”). 
20 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (“No static „test‟ can exist by which 
courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth 
Amendment „must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.‟ ” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality 
opinion))). 
21 Id. at 347 (“But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contempo-
rary standards are not unconstitutional.”). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
23 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
24 Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980) (quoting Cong. 
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger)). 
25 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“As remedial legislation, § 1983 is to be 
construed generously to further its primary purpose.”). 
4
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state.26  Additionally, leading scholars have proposed that there are 
additional elements, such as causation.27 
IV. FEDERAL APPROACH 
The mere assertion of a deprivation of a constitutional right 
does not automatically invoke recovery under Section 1983.28  Ac-
cordingly, in Rodriguez, it is uncontested that the plaintiff is an in-
mate protected by the Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  However, the court found that the plaintiff‟s 
slip and fall did not satisfy the requirements necessary to recover for 
an Eighth Amendment violation under Section 1983.29  To satisfy the 
two threshold elements necessary to bring a Section 1983 claim, the 
proponent must demonstrate several preliminary factors. 
a. The First Element: “The deprivation of any rights” 
First, the proponent must show with specificity facts which 
amount to a “deprivation of constitutional rights.”30  To determine 
whether an injury amounts to a deprivation of constitutional rights, 
the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan,31 required that the propo-
nent demonstrate, from an objective point of view, that the action re-
sulted in a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.32  A “sufficiently se-
rious” deprivation is one that fails to provide “minimal civilized 
measure[s] of life‟s necessities.”33  In Rodriguez, the plaintiff failed 
to specify a legitimate deprivation of a constitutional right and the 
 
26 Id. at 640 (acknowledging two elements set forth by the statutory language). 
27 See Symposium, PLI Section 1983 (2011) (transcript on file with author).  
28 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
29 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15. 
30 Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]o state a civil rights 
claim under § 1983, a complaint must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a 
deprivation of constitutional rights . . . .”); see also Koch v. Yunich, 533 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 
1976) (“Complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are plainly insufficient unless they 
contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of civil rights, rather than 
state simple conclusions.”). 
31 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
32 Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (acknowledging the objec-
tive components relied upon)). 
33 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
5
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court denied recovery under Section 1983.34 
b. The Second Element: “Deliberate Indifference” of 
the State actor 
The second element requires that the proponent show the “de-
fendants acted with „deliberate indifference.‟ ”35  Accordingly, for the 
prison official to have “deliberate indifference,” his “state of mind 
[must be] more blameworthy than negligence” yet “less than acts or 
omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge 
that harm will result.”36  In Farmer, the Supreme Court held that: 
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the 
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of 
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.37 
In Rodriguez, although the plaintiff alleged that the Warden had no-
tice of the wet floors but failed to fix them the court relied on case 
law that has established such allegations do not satisfy a Section 1983 
claim.38 
For a plaintiff to successfully bring a claim under Section 
1983, he must first make specific allegations of a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights and a showing that the prison official‟s state of mind 
amounted to a “deliberate indifference.”  Because the plaintiff in Ro-
driguez failed to satisfy these threshold elements his claim was prop-
erly denied. 
 
34 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15. 
35 Id. at 214.  See generally Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828-29 (defining „deliberate indifference‟ 
throughout). 
36 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 
37 Id. at 837. 
38 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 215 (citing Edwards v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 
05787(PGG), 2009 WL 259695, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009)). 
6
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c. Alternative Remedy: Negligence 
Although the plaintiff in Rodriguez failed to satisfy the re-
quirements for a Section 1983 claim, he was not precluded from re-
covering under a claim of negligence.  It is feasible that a tort may al-
so constitute a constitutional violation.39  However, it is well 
established that violations of tort law do not automatically rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation.40  For instance, the Supreme Court 
in Screws v. United States41 stated, “[t]he fact that a prisoner is as-
saulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does not neces-
sarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.”42  Accordingly, a fail-
ure to specifically articulate a constitutional violation lends itself to 
the theory of tort law, as opposed to constitutional law. 
Case law elicits a trend of failed Section 1983 claims resulting 
in negligence claims.  Such cases are applicable to the facts set forth 
in Rodriguez and provide a potential remedy.  For instance, in Here-
dia v. Doe,43 one court found that the plaintiff‟s allegation did not sa-
tisfy a claim for relief under Section 1983, although it did satisfy a 
negligence claim.44  The plaintiff, an inmate, slipped and fell just out-
side of his cell and did not receive medical treatment until the follow-
ing day.45  The court found that the plaintiff‟s allegation did not satis-
fy the requirements of specificity and state of mind set forth by 
federal decisions such as Farmer.46  Accordingly, the plaintiff was 
denied recovery under Section 1983.47  Several other cases have also 
found that claims involving a slip and fall failed to satisfy the re-
quirements necessary to bring a claim under Section 1983 for depri-
 
39 See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (applying the statute of limitations re-
garding false imprisonment to claims under Section 1983); Symposium, supra note 27. 
40 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s Due Process Clause allowed for recovery every time “the State may be cha-
racterized as the tortfeasor”); see also Symposium, supra note 27. 
41 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
42 Id. at 108-09. 
43 473 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
44 Id. at 463 (“Further, Plaintiff‟s allegations do not establish a § 1983 claim based on de-
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vation of constitutional rights.48  Therefore, even if the plaintiff is 
barred from recovering under Section 1983, such allegations may still 
satisfy a claim for negligence.49 
V. NEW YORK CASE LAW 
Courts in New York have followed an approach very similar 
to that set forth by federal precedent regarding a violation of Eighth 
Amendment rights.50  Cases mirroring the same fact pattern as Rodri-
guez have continuously held that slip and fall cases do not constitute 
claims recoverable under Section 1983.51  For instance, in Carr v. 
Canty,52 an inmate at the Center alleged that the flooding in the corri-
dors of his facility, that lasted four months, constituted a deprivation 
of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.53  To de-
termine whether this flooding did amount to a constitutional viola-
tion, the court applied the two requirements set forth by Farmer.54  
The court first found that the allegations did not satisfy a showing of 
“an objectively excessive risk.”55  Further, the court found that slip 
 
48 See Graham v. Poole, 476 F. Supp. 2d 257, 260 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that slip and 
fall cases satisfy a claim of negligence which is not recoverable under Section 1983). 
49 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 215. 
50 See Wooley v. New York State Dep‟t of Corr. Servs., 934 N.E.2d 310, 315 (N.Y. 2010) 
(“A violation of the Eighth Amendment can be proven only if an inmate can demonstrate 
that prison officials have acted with „deliberate indifference . . . .‟ comprised of an objective 
component and a subjective component.” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 
(1976))); see also Matter of Davis v. Fischer, 925 N.Y.S.2d 910, 910 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 
2011) (finding a failure to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard). 
51 See Carr v. Canty, No. 10 Civ. 3829(BSJ)(KNF), 2011 WL 309667, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 19, 2011); Johnson v. New York City, No. 10 Civ. 6193, (PKC) (JLC), 2011 WL 
1795284, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2011) (finding the allegations did not amount to a depri-
vation of constitutional rights afforded to prisoners under the Eighth Amendment). 
52 No. 10 Civ. 3829(BSJ) (KNF), 2011 WL 309667 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011). 
53 Id. at *1; 
Carr alleges that he slipped because “a busted pipe” flooded the corridor, 
as it had done for at least four months.  Prior to his slip-and-fall, Carr 
contends that he complained about the flooding to certain “housing of-
ficers,” who, in turn, notified their supervisors—the defendants.  The de-
fendants ordered that blankets be put over the water, according to Carr, 
but did not repair the pipe for months. 
Id. 
54 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
55 Sylla v. City of New York, No. 04-cv-5693(ILG), 2005 WL 3336460, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 8, 2005) (“Courts have regularly held that a wet or slippery floor does not pose an ob-
8
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and fall claims are typically not actionable under Section 1983, even 
where officials have notice of flooding and fail to remedy it.56  There-
fore, in Carr, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a claim 
that amounted to “inhumane or unreasonably risky” conditions neces-
sary for recovery under Section 1983.57 
Similarly, in Johnson v. New York City,58 the plaintiff, also an 
inmate at the Center, alleged that he “slipped and fell on July 26, 
2009 while walking with crutches across a wet floor . . . .”59  The 
plaintiff fell again approximately one month later.60  The plaintiff 
sustained “neck, back and foot pain” during the first fall and these in-
juries were aggravated by the subsequent fall.61  The court in Johnson 
found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements necessary to 
show a constitutional deprivation.62  Additionally, the court found 
that the plaintiff failed to show a “substantial risk of serious harm.”63 
From these two cases it becomes evident that allegations of 
harm sustained by slipping and falling on water caused by leaks with-
in the Center do not satisfy the requirements necessary to recover un-
der Section 1983.  At best, these facts patterns satisfy a claim for neg-
ligence, as noted by Edwards v. The City of New York,64 stating: 
Courts considering claims such as Plaintiff‟s have rou-
tinely found that similar allegations—i.e. allegations 
of wet floor conditions that caused a prisoner to slip 
and fall—at most support a finding of simple negli-
gence, and therefore do not support a claim that either 
the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment was 
 
jectively excessive risk to prisoners.”). 
56 Edwards, 2009 WL 259695, at *3 (“Moreover, courts have held that allegations of wet 
conditions leading to a slip-and-fall will not support a Section 1983 claim even where, . . . 
plaintiff also alleges that the individual defendants had notice of the wet condition but failed 
to address it.”). 
57 Carr, 2011 WL 309667, at *2. 
58 No. 10. Civ. 6193(PKC)(JLC), 2011 WL 1795284 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2011). 
59 Id. at *1. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at *4-5. 
63 Johnson, 2011 WL 1795284, at *4. 
64 No. 08 Civ. 05787(PGG), 2009 WL 259695 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009). 
9
Fiorenza: Watch Your Step
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1132 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
violated.65 
This finding reflects precedent set forth by federal cases such as 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,66 which have found that negligence 
does not satisfy a constitutional inquiry.67 
The facts from Rodriguez are virtually indistinguishable from 
cases such as Heredia and Carr.  Accordingly it is problematic to 
discern why the plaintiff in Rodriguez should be entitled to recovery 
for constitutional violations when the court has systematically denied 
similar claims.  Leading scholars in the area of Section 1983 have 
commented on the necessity for additional requirements in analyzing 
Section 1983 claims.68  Additional factors, such as causation, would 
further heighten the burden of proof necessary to satisfy a Section 
1983 claim.  Consequently, it is even less likely that the plaintiff in 
Rodriguez would be able to satisfy the requirements for a Section 
1983 claim.  This creates a gray area because the Eighth Amendment 
has continuously been expanded.  However, even under contempo-
rary standards, the facts of Rodriguez do not specify a constitutional 
violation.  But, it is likely that the plaintiff in Rodriguez would be 
able to recover under a theory of negligence.  This does not deprive 
the plaintiff of proper redress nor does it subordinate his rights to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained.  However, to allow a slip and 
fall to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation would overly 
extend the Eighth Amendment to frivolous allegations.  Perhaps if the 
plaintiff had substantiated his claim to further exemplify the effect 
flooded hallways had on his conditions of confinement he would 
have been satisfied the requirements of a Section 1983 claim.  How-
ever, as progressive as decisions regarding the Eighth Amendment 
have been, determinations of constitutional violations still require a 
substantial deprivation of rights. 
 
65 Id. at *2. 
66 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
67 Id. at 848-49; 
We have accordingly rejected the lowest common denominator of cus-
tomary tort liability as any mark of sufficiently shocking conduct, and 
have held that the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of 
state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically be-
neath the threshold of constitutional due process. 
Id. 
68 See Symposium, supra note 27. 
10
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VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
a.  Conditions of Confinement 
Although the Eighth Amendment is meant to be interpreted 
liberally, it is necessary to establish the parameters of its protection.  
Cases involving grossly subpar conditions of confinement pose legi-
timate claims that violate “cruel and unusual punishment.”
 69  Condi-
tions of confinement fall under the protections granted by the Eighth 
Amendment due to the theory that imprisonment revokes a prisoner‟s 
ability to provide for himself.70  In contrast to allegations of slip and 
fall, the following cases involving conditions of confinement illu-
strate hazardous, unhealthy situations which deprive inmates of basic 
necessities.  However, certain factors need to be considered to pro-
vide a standard that establishes what conditions are considered to be 
unconstitutional.  Accordingly, an analysis of these cases establishes 
the level of deprivation that amounts to a constitutional violation and 
is lacking in cases such as Rodriguez. 
The parameters established by this decision are crucial to the 
determination of whether cases involving slip and fall cases may be 
considered a deprivation of constitutional rights.  In Rhodes v. Chap-
man,71 two prisoners brought an action for deprivation of constitu-
tional rights due to “double celling.”72  The Supreme Court consi-
 
69 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (finding that confinement as “a form of 
punishment [is] subject to scrutiny under [the] Eighth Amendment standards”); Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (finding that conditions of confinement are also “subject 
to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment” standards). 
70 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; 
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the 
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual‟s liberty that 
it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to 
provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 
care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on 
state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 
Id. 
71 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
72 Id. at 339-40 (“Respondents . . . are inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(SOCF), a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio.  They were housed in the 
same cell . . . . [and] contended that „double celling‟ at SOCF violated the Constitution.  The 
gravamen of their complaint was that double celling confined cellmates too closely.”). 
11
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dered factors such as the impact double celling had on food, medical 
care, cleanliness, violence, work and education availability before 
concluding that double celling did not amount to a constitutional de-
privation.73  Additionally, the inmates in Rhodes, were subjected to 
double celling in an effort to deal with overcrowding.74  The process 
of double celling was not in response to a particular infraction and 
served no penalogical purpose.75  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
found that because double celling did not result in any consequences 
that could be defined as “punishment,” double celling did not consti-
tute a deprivation egregious enough to satisfy recovery for an Eighth 
Amendment claim under Section 1983.76  Further, Rhodes established 
one of the most significant standards applicable to “conditions of 
confinement” cases, the distinction between safety and comfort.77  
Therefore, although conditions of confinement may be so horrific as 
to amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights, mere issues of 
comfort will likely never satisfy such a claim. 
Thus far, the shortcomings of cases have illustrated what is 
required to demonstrate a constitutional violation of Eighth Amend-
ment rights.  Accordingly, when conditions of confinement deprive 
prisoners of basic human needs, surpassing mere comfort, the court is 
likely to consider those facilities unconstitutional.  For instance, in 
Holt v. Sarver,78 the United States District Court found that “there are 
limits to the rigor and discomfort of close confinement which a State 
 
73 Id. at 348. 
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in pris-
on population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical 
care, or sanitation.  Nor did it increase violence among inmates or create 
other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.  Although job and 
educational opportunities diminished marginally as a result of double 
celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not 
inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton pain; deprivations of this 
kind simply are not punishments. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
74 Id. 
75 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-50. 
76 Id. at 348 (“Although job and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a re-
sult of double celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not inflict 
pain, much less unnecessary and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not pu-
nishments.”). 
77 Id. at 349 (“But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . .”). 
78 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969). 
12
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may not constitutionally exceed.”79  In Holt, inmates were subjected 
to cells described as “dirty and unsanitary.”80  These cells were also 
“substantially overcrowded” and the prisoners inhabiting them were 
subjected to sharing mattresses that were uncovered and exposed to 
various venereal and infectious diseases.81  The court found that the 
totality of the circumstances regarding those prisoners confinement 
amounted to a deprivation of constitutional rights because they were 
so traumatic, hazardous and degrading.
 82  The court acknowledged 
that the space was physically uncomfortable, but found that the addi-
tional circumstances, such as the bare mattresses capable of transmit-
ting diseases, qualified the conditions of confinement as cruel and 
unusual punishment.83  Moreover, the prisoners in Holt, were held in 
isolation cells away from the general prison population due to their 
bad behavior.84  Therefore, unlike Rhodes, the conditions of confine-
ment were in response to a particular infraction and were meant to 
serve a penalogical purpose amounting to punishment.85  This distinc-
tion is a likely factor in the court‟s finding of unconstitutionality. 
From these decisions it appears that the constitutionality sur-
rounding conditions of confinement requires basic necessities and 
prohibits degrading, hazardous conditions.86  Implicit within Holt is 
 
79 Id. at 833. 
80 Id. at 832 (“[T]he isolation cells are dirty and unsanitary, . . . are pervaded by bad odors 
from the toilets, and . . . the plain cotton mattresses on which the inmates sleep are unco-
vered and dirty.”). 
81 Id. (“Thus an inmate has no assurance that the mattress alloted [sic] to him on any night 
is the same one that he had the night before . . . .  That problem is aggravated by the fact that 
some of the inmates of the cells suffer from infectious diseases.”). 
82 Id. at 833. 
The Court finds that the prolonged confinement of numbers of men in 
the same cell under the conditions that have been described is mentally 
and emotionally traumatic as well as physically uncomfortable.  It is ha-
zardous to health.  It is degrading and debasing; it offends modern sensi-
bilities, and, in the Court‟s estimation, amounts to cruel and unusual pu-
nishment. 
Holt, 300 F. Supp. at 833. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Compare Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (finding that double celling did not amount to pu-
nishment), with Holt, 300 F. Supp. at 833 (finding that isolation cells are forms of punish-
ment for dangerous inmates). 
86 Compare Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (requiring a deprivation of basic necessities such as 
“food, medical care, [and] sanitation”), with Holt, 300 F. Supp. at 833 (finding that because 
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the potential for prisons to be liable for conditions that may deprive 
its inhabitants of basic necessities.87  The factors provided by the Su-
preme Court, such as food, cleanliness and freedom from violence, 
are exemplary but not exhaustive.  Accordingly, in Rodriguez, an is-
sue of safety is raised regarding the flooded hallways of the Center.
 88  
It is plausible that a duty to provide basic necessities would include a 
duty to provide an environment free from the hazardous situations 
that may result in injury.  However, the courts have been reluctant to 
accept such an argument.89 
Further, in determining to what extent courts will be willing 
to apply Eighth Amendment protections, one must determine whether 
punishment encompasses general imprisonment or a particular occur-
rence resulting from a specific infraction taking place during impri-
sonment.90  In Rodriguez the plaintiff was walking in a common area 
when he sustained his injury.91  At that time, the plaintiff was impri-
soned for an act committed outside of the prison for which he was 
tried and sentenced.92  There is no indication in the record that the 
plaintiff was walking down the hallway as a result of a prison offi-
cial‟s discipline for an infraction occurring during imprisonment.  
Additionally, there is no indication that the flooding was caused or 
allowed to continue to serve a penalogical purpose or to directly tar-
get particular inmates to increase the chances of them falling and in-
juring themselves.93  It is just as likely that the Warden could have 
walked down the same common hallway and sustained an injury sim-
ilar to that of the inmates.  Just as the Supreme Court in Rhodes de-
termined that double celling served no penalogical purpose, the 
 
the totality of the circumstances amounted to such minimal care as to subject prisoners to 
health hazards, overcrowded isolation cells did amount to unconstitutional conditions of con-
finement). 
87 Holt, 300 F. Supp. at 834. 
88 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
89 Sylla, No. 2005 WL 3336460, at *3. 
90 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (referring to general imprisonment as a form of punishment 
in and of itself).  In contemplation of this line of cases it becomes apparent that one must 
come to terms with what form of punishment, be it general imprisonment or something more 
specific, is at issue. 
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flooded hallways in Rodriguez also served no penalogical purpose.94  
Therefore, although the facts of Rodriguez may fall under the umbrel-
la of conditions of confinement in its plain meaning, the circums-
tances simply do not rise to the level of a serious deprivation of basic 
necessities. 
b. Medical Treatment 
Cases involving a deprivation of immediate medical attention 
may potentially violate the Eighth Amendment.95  In Rodriguez, the 
plaintiff alleged that “defendants failed to provide him with imme-
diate medical attention after he slipped and fell.”96  However, the case 
is silent on the determination of that allegation—perhaps that is a re-
sult of the lack of specificity in the claim.97  Although the decision is 
lacking in information that could be compared to precedent, it is ne-
cessary to acknowledge medical treatment as another area rife with 
potential for constitutional violations. 
The decision in Estelle v. Gamble98 is important and applica-
ble because it demonstrates another avenue for recovery under Sec-
tion 1983 and also reiterates the requirements necessary to satisfy 
such recovery.99  In Estelle, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of 
alleged “cruel and unusual punishment” regarding the denial of med-
ical treatment over the course of several months.100  The facts state 
that the plaintiff was originally injured while working and was pre-
scribed medications for a lower back strain.101  The pain persisted and 
the plaintiff was supposed to be afforded certain accommodations, 
but these accommodations were ignored.102  At one point the prison 
 
94 Compare Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348, with Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
95 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the „unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,‟ . . . .”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion))). 
96 Rodriguez, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
97 Id. at 215. 
98 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
99 Id. at 103-05. 
100 Id. at 99-101 (outlining the progression of the plaintiff‟s injuries from the time of the 
initial injury on November 9, 1973 through February 11, 1974 when the plaintiff filed his 
complaint). 
101 Id. at 99. 
102 Id. (“He also ordered that respondent be moved from an upper to a lower bunk for one 
15
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staff even lost the plaintiff‟s prescribed medication, delaying his 
treatment.103  While still in pain, the plaintiff was brought before the 
prison for disciplinary review for his refusal to work.104  When the 
plaintiff was once more brought before the prison for disciplinary re-
view he was placed in solitary confinement.105  The plaintiff began to 
experience chest pains at the beginning of February and was repeat-
edly denied medical treatment.106  Subsequently, the plaintiff sought 
to recover damages for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights to 
protect him from “cruel and unusual punishment.”107 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court took into account the policy 
considerations for the Eighth Amendment, noting that one of the 
main objectives is to avoid “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”108  Based on the purpose behind the Eighth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court concluded: “These elementary principles establish the 
government‟s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is 
punishing by incarceration.  An inmate must rely on prison authori-
ties to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those 
needs will not be met.”109  The Supreme Court noted the range of 
harm denial of medical treatment could cause, from prolonging death 
to imposing pain that serves no penalogical purpose.110  Ultimately, 
any “deliberate indifference” regarding a prisoner‟s medical treat-
 
week, but the prison authorities did not comply with that directive.”). 
103 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 100. 
104 Id. at 101. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
On February 7, respondent again experienced pain in his chest, left arm, 
and back and asked to see a doctor.  The guards refused.  He asked again 
the next day.  The guards again refused.  Finally, on February 9, he was 
allowed to see Dr. Heaton, who ordered the Quinidine [heart medication] 
continued for three more days. 
Id. 
107 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101-02. 
108 Id. at 102-03 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173). 
109 Id. at 103. 
110 Id.  This is an interesting interpretation of “punishment,” especially following cases 
such as Rhodes and Holt.  In Estelle, the Supreme Court refers to incarceration as punish-
ment which renders prisoners dependent on prison officials for medical needs.  Id.  The Su-
preme Court rationalized the necessity of medical treatment to avoid punishment that served 
no penalogical purpose.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.  This illustrates the varying applications of 
the term “punishment” in varying contexts. 
16
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ment, whether by doctor or prison guard, satisfies the requirements 
for recovery under Section 1983.111  However, the Supreme Court did 
acknowledge that accidents, malpractice or misdiagnosis did not sa-
tisfy a claim under Section 1983.112  Applying these standards to the 
plaintiff filing suit, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff did not 
satisfy a claim recoverable under Section 1983 since he had been 
seen by doctors and treated for varying ailments.113  Ultimately, the 
facts set forth in the complaint amounted to a matter of “medical 
judgment.”114 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In light of precedent set forth by both federal and state cases it 
is evident that slip and fall cases do not constitute a deprivation of a 
constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment.115  To recover un-
der Section 1983, the plaintiff must first state with specificity a “de-
privation of constitutional rights.”116  They must then satisfy an ob-
jective and subjective test regarding the “deliberate indifference” of 
the prison official regarding the alleged deprivation.117  Although the 
plaintiff in Rodriguez failed to satisfy these requirements, case law 
has demonstrated an evolution of Eighth Amendment protection, and 
it may be a matter of time before slip and fall cases are recoverable 
under Section 1983.  The question is not only when and if that will 
happen, but whether it should happen.  Such an issue will be decided 
in cases to come, but the decision in Rodriguez, remains consistent 
with precedent.118  Presently, on a federal and a state level, slip and 
fall cases do not amount to a constitutional deprivation of a right to 
be free from “cruel and unusual punishment” as a result of conditions 
 
111 Id. at 104-05. 
112 Id. at 105-06. 
113 Id. at 107. 
114 Id. 
115 See Heredia, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 463; Carr, 2011 WL 309667, at *2 (finding that slip 
and fall cases satisfy claims of negligence, not violations of Eighth Amendment rights). 
116 Alfaro, 814 F.2d at 887 (requiring specificity in claims brought to recover under Sec-
tion 1983). 
117 See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (establishing the objective and 
subjective burdens). 
118 See Sylla, 2005 WL 3336460, at *3 (noting a trend of slip and fall claims being reco-
verable under negligence rather than under Section 1983). 
17
Fiorenza: Watch Your Step
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1140 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
of confinement. 
The purpose of this paper was not only to compare Rodriguez 
to precedent, but to set the bar for requirements a plaintiff alleging a 
constitutional violation based on a slip and fall would need to satisfy 
an Eighth Amendment claim through Section 1983 claim.  Accor-
dingly, while the plaintiff in Rodriguez failed to satisfy these re-
quirements future petitioners may fare better if they meet these re-
quirements from the outset.  To limit the plaintiff in Rodriguez to 
recovery under negligence does not deprive him of fairness or dam-
ages, nor does it restrict the application of the Eighth Amendment.  
Although the Eighth Amendment is meant to be construed from a 
progressive standpoint it is not without necessary standards that 
maintain its legitimacy.  Therefore, unless plaintiffs satisfy these re-
quirements, they will have to recover under negligence. 
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